







On Two Early Accounts on Metaphor by Aristotle and Hermogenes 
of Tarsus and Their Reception by Modern Interactionists
Abstract
The article discusses linguistic and epistemological presuppositions of the thesis, raised by 
the Irish classicist W. B. Stanford (1936), that the rhetorician Hermogenes of Tarsus, in his 
definition of metaphor, provided – in contrast to Aristotle’s “mere linguistic” description 
– a radically new, dynamic and reference­based conception of metaphoric speech, which he 
called tropé. For Stanford, it was a historical pre­figuration of his own “stereoscopic” ac­
count of metaphor, which later on, with Max Black and Paul Ricœur, inspired the so­called 
interactionist view of metaphor in various areas of philosophy of language and science, 
and in linguistics. In the article, Hermogenes’ idea of metaphor as a “common” name 
for different things has been related throughout the text to a three­level (linguistic, logical 
and epistemological) analysis of the theory of transference in Aristotle. The paper points, 
through brief references or more extended comments, to systematic relations between the 
two ancient theories and some contemporary, interactionist and cognitivist, contributions 
on metaphor theory (Ricœur, Lakoff and Johnson, Kittay). As a result, the supposed inter­
actionist explanation of metaphor in Hermogenes turns out to be rather continuous than 
hostile with respect to Aristotle’s analysis, which appears no less conceptual than linguistic. 
Moreover, both accounts clearly call for further analysis on more complex systematic levels, 

















































Stanford  can be qualified  thereby as one of  the pioneers –  if  not  the most 
important one – of the so-called interaction	theory	of	metaphor,	as	opposed	














































In	 his	 “Le	 retraît	 de	 la	métaphore”	 Jacques	
Derrida	 (1987)	 thought	 of	 metaphors,	 in	 a	
clear	 Nietzschean	 gesture,	 as	 being	 nothing	










sis	of	metaphor	 see	MacCormac	 (1990);	 In-
durkhya	(1994);	more	elaborated	in	Indurkya	











trary	 to	Derridas	verdict,	 in	 the	period	 from	
1970s	to	1990s	metaphors	became	one	of	the	
most	discussed	issues	worldwide	in	linguistic	
philosophy,	 analytic	 and	 hermeneutical,	 as	






Richards	 (1936),	 especially	 important	 to	








Stanford	 (1972),	 p.	 105.	On	 the	 problem	of	
“venturing”	metaphoric	definition	 in	a	 theo-
retical	 discourse	 with	 respect	 to	 Aristotle’s	






































wrong	direction,	and	what	modern	 theoretician	 like	Stanford	seem	 to	have	

































eral but also as occurrence or event	 in	 language.	Second,	 its	very	wording	
represents	an	exact	re-formulation	–	though	a	wholly	new	in	approach	–	of	
the Aristotelian  idea  of  transference  of  name  from  one  outer  object  to  the 















Aristotle  against  the  so-called  substitution 
theory	of	metaphor,	based	on	comparison of 
pre-existing	similarities,	which	in	fact	stems	
from	 Quintilian	 (Ricœur	 1976:	 35),	 he	 too	
assumes  that  Aristotle  considers  metaphors 
as	one-word-units.	Umberto	Eco	was,	to	my	
knowledge,	 the	 first	 to	 treat	Aristotle’s	 lin-
guistic account on metaphor in a non-reduc-
tive	 way	 (Eco	 1990,	 esp.	 chapters	 2.1	 and	
3.3.).	For	a	sentence-oriented	view	on	Aristo-
tle’s semantics and linguistics in general see 
Di	 Cesare	 (1981).	 An	 integrative	 approach	
to Aristotle’s metaphor account offers Lacks 
(1994).	 (For	 a	 more	 detailed	 discussion	 on	
Ricœur’s	 and	 Lakoff	 and	 Johnson’s	 (1999)	





ter,	 in:	 The	Works	 of	Aristotle,	 transl.	 into	
English	under	 the	editorship	of	W.	D.	Ross,	
vol.	XI,	Oxford	1946.	Greek	text	(p.	10,	n.1)	











Greek	 text	 in	 Stanford,	 ibid.,	 p.	 14,	 n.	 3	 is	
from	 L.	 Spengel,	 Rhetores Graeci,	 Vol.	 II,	





parà	 toîs	 grammatikoîs,	 ouch	 hôs	 ekeînoi	
légousi	tò	apò	tôn	apsychôn	epì	tà	émpsycha,	
















recent  discussion  on  Hermogenes’  role  in 

















problems	which	 Stanford	 clearly	 tends	 to	mystify	 by	 pleading	 for	 a	 “viv-
























new	 prospective	 but	 theoretically	 questionable.	 In	 spite	 of	 the	 differences	
between	 the	 two	definitions	of	metaphor	both	accounts,	 the	 referential	one	
by	Hermogenes	and	the	analytical	one	by	Aristotle,	relate	closely	on	another	
level,	which	Stanford	does	not	examine.	This	is	provided	by	the	fact	that	the	
Aristotelian	 account	 of	metaphor,	 displaying	 the	metaphor	 as	 a	 process	 of	
transference	 on	 two	 different	 levels,	 the	 linguistic-lexical	 one	 and	 logical-














too  takes  the  linguistic  level of names  as  the starting point  for his account 






















a	 semantic	 theory	of	 compound	names	with	an	“autonomous”	 (non-literal)	
meaning	with	respect	 to	 the	(literal)	meaning	of	 their	components.	Though	







As	 the	 citation	 above	 shows,	 Hermogenes	
refers  himself  critically  not  to  logical  areas 
of	transference	but	to	“alive	and	lifeless,	and	
vice-versa”	which	is	a	further	elaboration	of	
Aristotle’s	 account	 by	 the	 “grammarians”	






























See	 the	 historical	 works	 of	 Kennedy	 (esp.	
Kennedy1994).
23
As  for  comparative  reductionism  in  simile 

























This	 difference	 concerns	 the	 very	 theoretical	 kernel	 of	 how	 both	Aristotle	
and Hermogenes consider the status of metaphors within language. Though 
Hermogenes’	definition	is	formulated	in	an	essentialist	way,	just	like	Aristo-
tle’s	 (“metaphor	 is…”),25	his	 identification	of	metaphor	with	naming as an 
linguistic action seems to establish metaphors more radically as a part of ac­













–	now	with	Hermogenes’	 term	(koinón)	–	of	 two	 formerly  (i.e. outside  the 

















names”.	 For	 transference	 itself	 occurs,	 in	Aristotle’s	 account,	 as	 a	 process	




lematic	 formulation	 that	metaphors	 are	 cases	 of	 double	 reference,	 because	
they	must	additionally	be	differentiated	from	other	cases	of	bipolar	reference,	
Aristotle’s  account  gives  us  not  a  less  sophisticated  –  though  perhaps  less 




















Poetics	20,	1457a28–30:	heîs de esti lôgos di­
hôs, ê gar ho hèn semainon ê ho ek pleiónôn 
syndesmôi.
25
In  this  respect Stanford’s generic  translation 
“Oblique	Language	is	when	a	name	is	intro-
duced	into	sentence…”	is	not	only	extended	








Cf. Poetics,	Ch.	6,	1450b13	sq.:	légô de léxin 





conception  of  linguistic  representation  as 





general:  “Terms  used  in  their  proper  literal 






ever,	 to	 ignore	 that	Aristotle’s	 “prohibition”	
of  metaphors  in  An. Po.	 (97b37)	 is	 clearly	
related to definitions and demonstrative pro-
cedures	whereas	metaphors	 are	–	 for	 and	 in	
Aristotle – present not only in the explanatory 
discourse  of  the  science  but  also  –  just  like 
for Lakoff and Johnson – in the very grounds 











to	 be	 metaphorical	 is	 not	 to	 make	 a	 whole	









language	which	are	capable	of	meaning	 two  things at once,	are	amphíbola 
(such as homónyma),	and	they	are	just	standard	words	(kyria).	What	Hermo-
genes	arrives	at	with	his	definition	of	metaphor,	based	on	double-referring	
























































according	 to	Aristotle,	we	grasp	 the	“whole	 thing”	by	observing the simile 
between	things	(‘theôreîn tò hômoîon’)	and	not	by	knowing	all	existing	in-
stances. This appears  to be a necessary reason for Aristotle  to discriminate 
sufficiently	 metaphoric	 language	 from	 definitions.	 However,	 on	 the	 other	



























form  of  predication  but  rather  fully  and  ex-
plicitly	asserts	it.	Moreover,	as	I	have	already	
shown,	 it	 is	 prepared	 in	 Aristotle’s	 “more	
abstract”	 linguistic	 account	 in	Poetics,	 Chs.	








that  the act of noetic grasping the similarity 
(which	they	take	for	an	“intuitive	perception	
of	 the	 similarity	 in	 dissimilars”)	 cannot	 in	
Aristotle  be  correctly  accounted  for  on  the 
assumption  of  a  direct  correspondence  rela-
tion	 between	 things,	 ideas,	 and	 expressions.	
Noûs	 is	an	 inherent	agent	within	 the	natural	












of  thing  to  designate  another  kind  of  thing 
is	 to	 point	 out	 some	 similarity	 between	 the	
kinds	of	things.”	It	is	not	clear	how	it	should	
be	possible	for	Aristotle,	or	anyone,	to	point	
out  similarity  between  things  if  not  through 
transferring  structures  from  one  conceptual 
domain  to	 another	 (gender-species,	 gender-
gender),	which	 is,	more	 exactly,	 a	 reference	
by Aristotle  to  analogy	 as	 a	 framework	 for	
metaphor	explanation	and	not,	as	Lakoff	and	
Johnson’s	 tacitly	 assume,	 to	 similarity	 of	
mere things.
29
Just  as  the  strategic arché  comes about  in  a 
battle	out	of	disorder	when	one	stands	firm-
ly,	 and	 then	others	 stand	 to	him	one	by	one	
(henòs stántos, héteros éstê, eíth’ héteros) 
























































through  a double  reference  turns out  to  be  rendered possible  only  through 
Aristotle’s	account	on	transference	of	concept-names,	yet	with	the	difference	
















For	Aristotle	 too,	 no	 less	 than	 for	Hermogenes,	metaphors	 can	 be	 seen	 as	
events,	 for	 they	occur	within	 language	by	being	exhibited	 through	actions 
with	words	and	thought	processes.
4.













sition-oriented	understanding	of	metaphoric	 language	which	 is	 to	be	 found	
more direct in Aristotle’s Rhetoric	than	in	his	word-based	analysis	in	Poetics. 





At  this  point  it  seems  clear  enough  that  for 




Ricœur  does  not  seem  to  recognize  that  the 
issue  of  similarity  in  Aristotle’s  account  of 
metaphor is closely related to his tì katà tinós-
analysis	 of	 speech,	which	 is	 conceptual	 and	
propositional	and	not	sentence-based,	and	this	
seems	to	be	the	reason	why	he	believes	that	






cal  context of metaphor both  in  ancient  and 
in modern philosophies of science see Lloyd 



















Thus	 besides	 the	 supposed	 dynamic	 (twofold,	 stereoscopic)	 character	 of	
metaphor  in Hermogenes  the  consequence of his  account  is  that  the  entire 































In	 this	 sense,	Aristotle’s	 account,	 defining	metaphors	 as	 a	 thought-process	





focusing	 on	 metaphoric	 expression	 as	 double-sided	 reference,	 emphasizes	
just	that	aspect	of	the	metaphor	theory	which	in	Aristotle’s	approach	remained	






to	provide	general	 categories	 (species,	 genus)	 and	 thought	patterns	 (analo-
gies)  for  analytic  purposes  of  understanding  particular  metaphoric  expres-
sions,	be	they	one-word-based	or	sentence-based.
By	 this,	 however,	 it	 is	 not	 asserted	 that	 to	 provide	 background	 conditions	

















analysis  proceeds  as  defining  conditions of  understandability  and provides 
















conceptual	metaphors,	 that	 is,	mappings	across	conceptual	domains.	Blind	 to	his	own	meta-
phors,	he	was	forced	by	his	own	consistent	application	of	his	metaphors	to	a	theory	of	metaphor	
that	was	inadequate	to	describe	either	his	own	metaphors	or	anyone	else’s.”















For  a  more  recent  systematic  discussion  on 







At  this  point  of  the  analysis  of Aristotle’s  and  Hermogenes’  definitions  of 
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O dva rana objašnjenja metafore kod Aristotela i Hermogena 
iz Tarsa i njihovoj recepciji kod suvremenih interakcionistâ
Sažetak
Članak istražuje jezične i epistemološke pretpostavke teze irskog klasičnog filologa W. B. Stan­
forda (1936.) da je retoričar Hermogen iz Tarsa u svojoj definiciji metafore – za razliku od 
Aristotelovog »puko jezičnog« opisa – dao radikalno novu, dinamičnu koncepciju metaforičkog 
govora, zasnovanu na referenciji, koju je nazvao tropé. Za Stanforda je to bila povijesna pre­
figuracija njegovog vlastitog »stereoskopskog« shvaćanja metafore koje je kasnije, s Maxom 
Blackom i Paulom Ricœurom u 60­im i 70­im godinama 20. st. inspirirala tzv. interakcionistički 
pogled na metaforu u raznim područjima filozofije jezika i znanosti te lingvistike. U članku 
se Hermogenova ideja metafore kao »zajedničkog« imena za različite stvari stavlja u odnos s 
trostrukom (lingvističkom, logičkom i epistemološkom) analizom teorije prijenosa kod Aristo­
tela; kroz kraće rubne primjedbe ili opsežnije komentare članak ukazuje na sistematske veze 
između dviju antičkih teorija i suvremenih rasprava o metafori. U konačnici ispostavlja se da 
je navodno interakcionističko objašnjenje metafore kod Hermogena prije u kontinuitetu nego u 
sukobu s Aristotelovom analizom, koja sâma nije manje konceptualna nego što je jezična. Usto, 
oba razumijevanja metafore pozivaju jasno na daljnje analize na složenijoj sistematičkoj razini, 







Über zwei antike Metaphererklärungen bei Aristoteles und Hermogenes 
von Tarsus und deren Rezeption durch gegenwärtige Interaktionisten
Zusammenfassung
Der Aufsatz erörtert linguistische und epistemologische Voraussetzungen der vom irischen Phi­
lologen W. B. Stanford (1936) aufgestellten These, dass der Rhetoriker Hermogenes von Tarsus 
in seiner Definition der Metapher – im Unterschied zu Aristoteles’ „bloß linguistischer“ Defi­
nition – eine radikal neue, dynamische und auf Referenz basierende Konzeption der metapho­
rischen Rede, die er tropé nannte, entworfen habe. Für Stanford bedeutete dies eine historische 
Vorwegnahme seiner eigenen „stereoskopischen“ Auffassung der Metapher, die ihrerseits spä­
ter, durch Max Black und Paul Ricœur, die sogenannte interaktionistische Konzeption der Meta­
pher in verschiedenen Gebieten der Sprach­ und Wissenschaftsphilosophie sowie der Linguistik 
motiviert hat. Über den ganzen Aufsatz hinweg wird Hermogenes’ Idee der Metapher als “ge­
meinsamer Name” für unterschiedliche Dinge in eine dreistufige (linguistische, logische und 
epistemologische) Analyse der Übertragungstheorie bei Aristoteles einbezogen; durch kürzere 
Randbemerkungen oder umfangreichere Kommentare verweist die Arbeit auf einige systemati­
sche Zusammenhänge zwischen den beiden antiken Theorien und zeitgenössischen Metapherde­
batten. Im Endergebnis zeigt sich die bei Hermogenes vermutete interaktionistische Erklärung 
der Metapher eher als Fortführung denn als Gegensatz gegenüber der Aristotelischen Analyse, 
die ihrerseits nicht minder konzeptuell als linguistisch ausfällt. Darüber hinaus rufen beide 
antiken Erklärungen der Metapher zu weiteren Erörterungen auf komplexeren systematischen 











A propos de deux concepts anciens de métaphore, ceux d’Aristote et d’Hermogène 
de Tarse, et de leur reception parmi les interactionnistes contemporains
Résumé
L’article examine les présuppositions linguistiques et épistémologiques de la thèse dressée par 
le classiciste irlandais W. B. Stanford (1936), selon laquelle le rhétoricien Hermogène de Tarse 
avait proposé dans sa définition de la métaphore – par opposition à la description « purement 
linguistique » faite par Aristote – une conception du discours métaphorique radicalement nou­
velle, dynamique et fondée sur la référence, qu’il avait appelée tropê. Pour Stanford, ceci pré­
figurait historiquement sa propre conception « stéréoscopique » de la métaphore qui, plus tard, 
avec Max Black et Paul Ricæur dans les années 1960 et 1970, a inspiré le regard dit interac­
tionniste, porté sur la métaphore dans différents domaines de la philosophie du langage et de la 
science tout comme de la linguistique. L’article analyse l’idée de métaphore selon Hermogène 
en tant que nom « commun » des choses différentes et la met en rapport avec une analyse à trois 
niveaux – linguistique, logique et épistémologique – de la théorie du transfert chez Aristote ; 
l’article souligne les relations systématiques entre ces deux théories anciennes et les discussions 
contemporaines sur la métaphore. Résultat, l’explication de la métaphore chez Hermogène, 
supposée être interactionniste, s’avère être davantage dans la continuité que dans le conflit par 
rapport à l’analyse d’Aristote, qui n’est pas moins conceptuelle que linguistique. En outre, les 
deux définitions requièrent clairement une analyse approfondie, à un niveau systématique plus 
complexe, que les auteurs contemporains qui traitent de la métaphore reconnaissent à peine 
chez Hermogène comme chez Aristote.
Mots-clés
définition	d’Aristote	et	de	Hermogène	de	Tarse	de	la	métaphore,	interaction	vs	substitution,	analyse	
linguistique	vs	analyse	conceptuelle,	référence	double,	dénomination	vs	transfert	du	nom,	logos	as-
sertif,	acte	de	référence	et	de	parole
